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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
Case No. 20140525-SC

V.

MATTHEW A. MACKIN,
Defendant/ Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Mackin did not intend to use his vehicle dangerously, as required by the law,
and as such, did not commit an aggravated robbery. Additionally, the court erred in
failing to grant J\.fr. Mackin a continuance to secure his witnesses' as well as Mitchell's
presence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Mr. Mackin could not commit an aggravated
robbery when he did not intend to use the vehicle
dangerously to perpetuate a robbery.

The State argues that Mr. Mackin cannot prove a sufficiency claim for aggravated
robbery because Mitchell was hanging out of a car window going as much as 25 miles per
hour, which would certainly make the automobile in this case capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury. Aple's Br. at 23-27. It also claims Mr. Mackin failed to account for
the speed and driving of the vehicle in his point. Id.
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A. MITCHELL NEVER TESTIFIED THAT MR. MACKIN DROVE WITH HER
HANGING OUT OF THE VEHICLE

Mitchell's testimony did not account for two key facts that the State merely
assumes occurred: 1) that Mr. Mackin was driving the vehicle before she entered it (as
opposed to letting it roll as they struggled over the purse) and 2) that he drove the vehicle
as it traveled down the roadway. Indeed, nothing in Mitchell's testimony establishes that
the car was driven in a forward direction before she entered it or that Mr. Mackin drove
with Mitchell hanging out. Thus, the State did not show, even if all its evidence is

believed, that the car was used in a dangerous manner.
Mitchell testified that she went to the open passenger door, leaned in the window
and grabbed the purse. R. 468: 148-49. Mr. Mackin had one hand on the purse and one
on the steering wheel and the two struggled over the purse. R. 468: 150. The car then
started to roll: "it's a - it's a stick shift, but it started to roll and he had let go, like he had
let go of my purse and I grabbed it." R. 468: 150. Mitchell continued,
A. Because he had started the car and he had put, it was in neutral and
that, and it started to roll back when he took his foot off the brake .

Q As far as you know, at that point he hadn't engagedfirstgear?
A. No, not yet.

Q He's, it's just rolling because he's got the clutch depressed?
A. At first, yes .

R. 468: 151 (emphasis added). Mitchell said that they rolled while the clutch was
depressed for five feet while she sidestepped. R. 468: 151. By this point she had lifted her
feet off the ground. R. 468: 151 . She added that it "was probably 10, maybe 10 feet before
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I lifted my feet into the car." R. 468:151 -52. She admitted that while she hung out of the
car, the car went "not very far," before she was able to pull herself in. R. 468:137-38.
Speed was picking up, she testified, but she was able to pull herself into the car. R.

468: 152 . She then said from her entry to the stop sign was another 100 feet. R. 468: 152.
The State hinges much of its argument on one piece of Mitchell's testimony, on
redirect examination, where she said that they were halfway down the street when she got
her body into the car and that the car was going "[m}abye 25, not even 25 miles an hour."
R. 468: 155 (emphasis added). From this, the State concludes that Mr. Mackin "drove
down the street, reaching a speed of up to 2 5 m.p.h., while Mitchell was still hanging
halfway out of the car." Aple's Br. at 25 (emphasis added).
Mitchell did not ever testify that Mr. Mackin drove the car with her hanging out of
it. She testified that the car rolled backwards five feet while she sidestepped and that it
moved another 10 feet with her feet in the air before she pulled herself into the car. R .

468: 151-52. At no point does she say that Mr. Mack.in drove the vehicle with her hanging
out. Nor does she testify they went 25 miles per hour. She testified that it was "not even

25 miles an hour." R. 468:1 55. It could have been ten or even five miles per hour. The
car could have been rolling backwards the entire time before Mitchell entered it. The
State's construction of the evidence amounts to nothing more than an inference rather
than what Mitchell testified to.
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B. THE

STATE DID NOT PROVE THE DANGEROUS WEAPON
ENHANCEMENT BECAUSE MR. MACKIN DID NOT USE THE CAR AS A
DANGEROUS WEAPON WITH THE INTENT TO ROB SOMEONE

Nor does this scenario meet the dangerous weapon enhancement contemplated by
the legislature. Mr. Mackin argued to this Court that the way that he used the automobile
does not meet the elements of a dangerous weapon. And the State rather simplistically
focuses on one part of the dangerous weapon statute, but fails to note the other four
factors the legislature requires courts to consider as part of the dangerous weapon
enhancement.1 The first part of the statute "does not appear in isolation but is limited by
the second sentence." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

1 This

offense occurred in May of 2013. The legislature subsequently amended the statute
to make the following changes:
(6)(a) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(i) a firearm; or

(ii) an item object that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury.
(b) The following factors shall be are used in determining whether a knife,
or another item any object, or thing not common})- knovm as a dangerous
weapon other than a firearm, is a dangerous weapon:

(i) tl1e character of the instrument, location and circumstances in which the
object, or thing was used or possessed;
(ii) the primary purpose for which tl1e object was made;

tif1 (iii) the character of the wound, if any, produced, if any, by the object's
unlawful use;
tffi1 (iv) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was unlawfully
used;
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The following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, or
another item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing may
be used.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (2013). The legislature did not have cars in mind as
dangerous weapons unless they were used in a particular manner. As to the first factor, a
car, in and of itself, is not ordinarily used dangerously. It transports people. To the second
factor, Mitchell suffered no injuries as a result of the driving, so there is a lack of wound.
And for the fourth factor, cars are most often used lawfully.

tivJ M

whether the manner in which the object is used or possessed
constitutes a potential imminent threat to public safetv; and

M .(yil the

other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing
may be used.

UT LEG IS 428(2014), 2014 Utah Laws Ch. 428 (H.B. 268). The bill's stated change was
to "define □ dangerous weapon as a firearm or an object which is used unlawfully to inflict
serious bodily injury." Id. Indeed, the bill's sponsor said that the purpose for the
amendments was to allow restricted persons the ability to possess other weapons, such as
archery equipment. House Debates, March 4, 2014, H.B. 268. He acknowledged that the
prior wording was "ambiguous" and that it was too broadly applied to prevent people
from lawfully engaging in activities such as "cutting a steak or carving their Thanksgiving
turkey." Id. (Comments of Rep. Brian M. Greene). The legislature cannot "categorically
list a number of objects," he asserted, but rather the item's dangerousness should be
construed on a case-by-case basis. Id.
If anything, this legislative history reflects the legislature's ongoing desire to limit a
dangerous weapon to either a firearm or an item that is used dangerously.
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Only the third factor conceivably could make the car a dangerous weapon but
only if Mr. Mackin intended to use the car that way. The statute specifically focuses on
the ((manner" in which the ordinarily non-dangerous object was used. Id. The classic case
would involve a person ramming another with a car. See State v. Green, 502 A.2d 1049,
1050 (Me. 1986) ("defendant acted recklessly and used his car as a dangerous weapon
when he pinned a police officer between his car and a parked car"); Winkler v. State, 45
Okla. Crim. 322, 283 P. 591, 592 (1929) ("An automobile, when propelled against a
person, is a dangerous weapon."). That, however, was not the case here.
To commit an aggravated robbery, the statute explicitly requires Mr. Mackin to
"useO or

threaten □

to use a dangerous weapon" when he "intentionally ... take[s]

personal property in the possession of another" "with a purpose or intent to deprive the
person permanently or temporarily of the personal property." Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6302(1) and 76-6-301. Therefore, for Mr. Mackin to be convicted of aggravated robbery,
he must have 1) used the vehicle dangerously as 2) part of his overall intent to take
another's property, since a vehicle is not ordinarily dangerous of itself. This did not occur,
since at most, Mr. Mackin, when struggling over the purse, allowed the car to move ten
feet through an unknown method. Mitchell's testimony supports that Mr. Mackin's
conduct was not intentional to either the dangerousness element or to take personal
property, since she admitted the car rolled while the two fought over the purse and not
that Mr. Mackin tried to use the car as a weapon to facilitate or commit a robbery.
Indeed, even if one were to assume that Mr. Mackin drove the vehicle with
Mitchell hanging out, he still did not use tl1e car as a weapon, but rather to flee the scene.
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•

If the State's reading of the statute were true, every getaway driver who excessively speeds

away from the crime scene could also be convicted of aggravated robbery since he would
have driven dangerously (and hence, used a car in a way that creates an increased risk of
death or bodily injury to others) and thereby converted his car 1nto a dangerous weapon.
This was the very concern that prompted the legislature to amend the statute in 2014. See
note 1, infra. The concern was that the police could take lawful hunting equipment (or a
lawful car) and convert it to a dangerous weapon. Id. They clarified that the dangerous
weapon factors have always rested on the manner in which the object was used. Id.
In the firearm context, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the
dangerous weapon must be used intentionally as a weapon. In Bailey v. United States, 516
U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995) (superseded by statute as stated in

Abbottv. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 16,131 S. Ct. 18, 25,178 L. Ed. 2d 348 (20 10)) the
defendant was convicted of an offense that required him to "useO or [carry] a firearm"
during a crime of violence or a drug trafficking offense. Id. at 142-43. The Court found
that the statute's use of the word "use" required "evidence sufficient to show an active

employment of the firearm by the defendant." Id. at 143 (emphasis in original). The Court
examined the word "use":
The word "use" in the statute must be given its "ordinary or natural"
meaning, a meaning variously defined as "[t]o convert to one's service," "to
employ," "to avail oneself of," and "to carry out a purpose or action by
means of." Smith, supra) at 228- 229, 113 S.Ct., at 2054 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Webster's New International Dictionary of English
Language 2806 (2d ed.1949) and Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th
ed.1990)). These vanous definitions of "use" imply action and
implementation.
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Id. at 145.
Mr. Mackin must not merely drive the vehicle or allow it to roll, even as part of a
robbery. The legislature has said that he must "use" the dangerous weapon. Therefore,
he must actively and intentionally use the vehicle both dangerously and to "carry out a
purpose" of a robbery. Id. Because a car is not ordinarily dangerous, to qualify as a
dangerous weapon its use must intentionally be dangerous. Striking a person with the
vehicle and stealjng their property would fit under the statute. Clearly, pointing a gun or
a knife at someone when you take their property fits. But in this case, Mr. Mackin's use of
the vehicle was not intentionally dangerous, nor was it intentionally to perpetrate a
robbery.
The State wants this court to read a reckless element into the statute-that if Mr.
Mackin recklessly used the vehicle as a weapon, i. e., allowing the car to roll or even
driving recklessly-which neglects the statute's requirement that he intentionally used the
vehicle as a weapon as part of an overall purpose to rob a person. See State v. Jones, 405
A.2d 149, 151 (Me. 1979) ("We do not understand the state to argue that evidence of
reckless operation of a motor vehicle would be in itself sufficient to sustain a conviction
for reckless conduct with the use of a dangerous weapon"). The legislature's choice to
require intentional conduct for this offense negates the State's approach.
Therefore, of the four factors at issue, three of them do not make the car a
dangerous weapon at all. Of the one that remains, Mr. Mackin's conduct, even if the
State's facts are fully believed, was not used as a dangerous weapon since there was no
evidence presented that Mr. Mackin actually drove the vehicle dangerously and whatever
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conduct he did commit (struggling over the purse while a car rolled for ten feet) did not
constitute the intentional use of a dangerous weapon to further a robbery.

POINT II
Mr. Mackin was entitled to a continuance to both
secure the key witness's testimony against hhn and
to provide rebuttal testim.ony 2

The State rejects Mr. Macki.n's point that his counsel inadequately cross-examined
Mitchell and argues that so long as some cross-examination occurred at the preliminary
hearing, then no violation can occur at trial. Aple's Br. at 29-30. It argues that counsel
conducted an adequate cross-examination that explored the issues Mr. Mackin raises on
appeal and that he can identify no new issues that were not explored. Aple's Br. at 30-33.
However, this argument neglects that fact that both Mr. Mackin and his standby
counsel believed that Mitchell was inadequately cross-examined at the preliminary
hearing and that the late-disclosure of Mitchell's non-presence hampered Mr. Mackin's
ability to present this key testimony at his trial. R. 4-68:9-10, 12- 13. Mr. Mackin did not
know of Mitchell's unavailability until the day of trial, which standby counsel said
"greatly compromised Mr. Macki.n's ability to prepare for trial and determine what

The State divides Mr. Mackin's two subpoints into separate issues when they are not.
Both claims should fall under the same contention: Mr. Mackin should have been entitled
to a continuance, as he requested, to secure not only Mitchell's presence but the presence
of his other witnesses (as he subsequently and successfully did on both points in his second
trial) given Mitchell's late-disclosed non-appearance and his standby counsel's failure to
procure their attendance. See Aplt's Br. at 19 ("The trial court erred in not allowing Mr.
Mackin a continuance to subpoena witnesses essential to his defense and to secure
Mitchell's presence for cross-examination").
2

9

evidence he might need in light of her unavailability" and which prompted a Sixth
Amendment objection. R. 468: 15.
This is a fundamentally different argument that merely saying Mr. Mackin had the
opportunity to cross-examine Mitchell at the preliminary hearing and her testimony was
erroneously admitted. Rather, as he argued, he was "not afforded a fair opportunity" to a
continuance because he could not cross-examine Mitchell or bring in additional evidence
because of her non-appearance. Aplt's Br. at 19-36.
This court has said that "a defendant must be given an effective opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses called against him." State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5,

,r 28,

20 P.3d 271

(emphasis added). A defendant cannot properly prepare for trial ifhe does not know, until
the day of trial, that the State's key witness will not be testifying. See e.g., Com. u.

Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 675, 25 N.E.3d 273, 284 (2015) (when the prosecution
provided notice that its witness was unavailable the first day of trial "the Commonwealth's
failure to make the 'good faith effort' of providing timely notice to the court and the
defendant of its claim of [a witnesses'] unavailability" supports a finding that the
defendant's confrontation rights were violated). Thus, Mr. Mackin's needed a
continuance to gather evidence for Mitchell's non-presence given the State's latedisclosure of her unavailability. 3

The State asserts that Mr. Mackin does not challenge the finding of unavailability.
Aple's Br. at 29. That was the entire substance of Mr. Mackin's claim- that the court
erred in failing to grant a continuance. The court's finding that Mitchell was unavailable
and that the State had made good faith efforts to secure her presence was the basis for
denying the continuance and is Mr. Mackin's objection on appeal.

3

10

The State failed to make a good faith effort to procure Mitchell's attendance at
trial. As the State's investigator noted, for two weeks prior to trial, from December 25,
2013 to the trial date on January 15, 2014, he made no effort to secure Mitchell's
presence other than to check records. R. 468:6. The prosecutor, additionally, had conta t
with Mitchell just a few days prior to trial:
My next contact with Ms. Mitchell came I believe on the 6th of this month,
so January 6 of this year. She left a message with me asking, you know,
wanted to checkup and see what was going on with the trial. She left a
number for me to call. That day or a couple of days later I called back that
number, spoke to a male, indicated that was his number and he would give
my message to JVls. Mitchell. I did not hear back from her.

R. 468:8. The prosecutor spoke with Mitchell's mother, who had not seen her daughter
since the new year. R. 468:8-9.
The State knew for weeks that it was having difficulty locating Mitchell and had an
obligation to disclose that fact to Mr. Mackin well before the day of trial. The State can
_use an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony at trial, so long as it made a
good faith effort to obtain the witness's presence at trial. State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119,
1122 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Oniskor) 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 78, 38 L.Ed.2d 112 (1974); Statev. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537,539 (Utah
1981)). However, that is not what happened here.
As this court has put it, the "'good faith efforts' test is not to be considered lightly":

We cannot affirm the admission of preliminary hearing testimony where the
party's efforts to secure the witness's attendance are cursory, where the
party had clear indications that the witness would not attend or where the
party had obvious means of obtaining those indications but neglected to do
so.
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Chapman, 655 P.2d at 1122.

In this case, the State made nothing more than "[h] alf-hearted last minute efforts"
to secure Mitchell's appearance. Id. at 1123. Their last personal contact with Mitchell was
in December and from there the State did nothing other than make a few phone calls,
attempt to serve a subpoena at what they knew were outdated addresses, and check law
enforcement records during the interim. R. 468:3-9. These type of efforts "are insufficient
to demonstrate good faith and override the defendant's constitutional rights of
confrontation at trial." Chapman, 655 P.2d at 11 23. Nor do they amount to "reasonable
diligence" to locate the witness. Gallegos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1974).

As Mr. Mackin asked during cross-examination, "from December 30 th until I guess
the 13 th , what all did you do to try to track [Mitchell] down?" R. 468:6. The response was
that the officer 'Just check[ed] records [and] watch[ed] (inaudible) Dex to see if there was
any more contact with law enforcement." R. 468:6. Even though the last information
they had was that Mitchell was at her mother's house, and the officer acknowledged that
she could have been there, they did not call her mother or go out to her house between
December 25, 2013 andjanuary 13, 2014. R . 468:3, 6-7. When they contacted Mitchell's
mother the day before trial, she indicated that Mitchell had moved out around the first of
the year. R. 468:8-9. In Chapman, like here, the "the prosecution knew where to contact"
Mitchell, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence for two weeks to guarantee her
presence and although it made some last minute efforts, these did not amount to good
faith. Chapman, 655 P.2d at 1121, 1123.
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Even more problematically, even if the State made good faith efforts, it knew, as
early as December 30, 2013 (when it was unable to locate Mitchell at two addresses) that
it was having difficulty locating her. It certainly could have disclosed this fact to Mr.
Mackin weeks earlier, rather than on the first day of trial, sixteen days later. Its failure to
disclose this fact to the defense prohibited Mr. Mack.in from making his own reasonable
efforts to secure her presence, and as he told the court, prevented him from calling
additional witnesses to rebut Mitchell's preliminary hearing testimony. R. 468:9-10, 1213.
The State had a duty to make this disclosure, since its non-disclosure prevented
Mr. Mack.in from adequately preparing his defense. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16 (State must
disclose "any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately
prepare his defense"). This duty is ongoing, and when it appeared it could not contact
l\1itchell, the State should have informed Mr. Mackin. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 917
tah 1987).
The State incorrectly asserts that the issue is simply that Mr. Mackin did not have
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Mitchell at the preliminary hearing. Rather,
he argued down below, and on appeal, that he needed a continuance because the State
disclosed the first day of trial that Mitchell was unavailable and had they properly
disclosed that fact, Mr. Mackin would have either found her himself or called additional
witnesses. See R. 468: 15-16; Aplt's Br. at 19. Mr. Mackin's arguments about the adequacy
of cross-examination at the preliminary hearing illustrate the harm from the lack of
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continuance. Mr. Mackin was harmed because Mitchell was not present and because his
counsel failed to fully cross-examine Mitchell at the preliminary hearing, he lacked the
ability to fully grapple with her testimony at trial.
The State also argues that Mr. Mackin cannot show any untapped lines for crossexamining Mitchell. Aple's Br. at 32-33 . This inaccurately assumes that there was no
relevance to the fact that Mitchell, according to the non-presented testimony, had stolen
property and drug paraphernalia in her purse, and was staying in a stolen motor home.
Mr. Mackin wanted to impeach Mitchell based on evidence that he had regarding these
facts. R. 468:18.

Mr. 1\.1ackin sought the testimony of numerous witnesses, all of whom would have
added credence to Mr. Mackin's claim that Mitchell stole the purse, that it had stolen
contents inside it, including a cell phone and syringes, and that she was in a stolen motor
home. 4 The State responds that seizing property in another's possession (even if stolen) is
not a defense to robbery. Aple's Br. at 39-4-0. Its point is that whether the property was
On appeal, Mr. Mackin inadvertently failed to include the names of three additional
witnesses that Mr. Mackin proffered to the trial court. See Aple's Br. at 38 n.9. However,
the State was aware (and in fact briefed) this fact and has suffered no prejudice from this
omission. Nor does the omission seem to change the State's argument that none of the
testimony (even from the additional three) amounted to material evidence.
4

The State also argues that Mr. Mackin has not shown that the unofficial transcript lacked
accuracy. Errata sheet. That is not tl1e governing standard. Indeed, in Taylar Electric, the
Court of Appeals found that even though one party did "not contend that any part of the
transcript is inaccurate," the district court did not err in rejecting its admissibility because
the person was not an official transcriptionist and it was prepared by a party in the case.
Taylar Elec., Inc. v. Fox Const., Inc., 2012 UT App 324, ~ 8, 291 P.3d 821, citing Utah R.
Jud. Admin. R . 5-202(2). Similarly, the use of a non-certified transcript was erroneous in
and of itself in this case since it was prepared by non-certified transcriptionist who was a
party to the case.
14

stolen or not, Mr. Mackin had no right to take it forcefully from Mitchell, nor could he
make a citizen's arrest. Id.
But this was not Mr. Mackin's defense. He never admitted that he forcibly took
property from Mitchell. His defense ,vas that he observed stolen property and that he
took it, also intending to inform police of the RV's theft. R. 468:180. Even Mitchell
testified that Mr. Mackin "picked up my purse" and walked out of the motor home. R.
468: 136; 468: 148 ("he walked out of the motor home before me and that - so he
proceeded to walk directly to his car and I'm yelling at him because he was walking fast. I
was trailing behind him and I was yelling at him to give me my purse back"). She did not
reach him until he was already in the car. R. 468: 148. At no point did Mr. Mackin take
the purse from Mitchell by means of force or violence. He grabbed it, walked out and got
in the car. While there was a struggle subsequently in the car, that, according to Mr.
Mackin was not his attempt to rob her, but to take the evidence to the police. R. 469:1 35,
137-38. The fact that Mitchell assaulted him and fought over the purse is not evidence of
a robbery, according to the defense, but of her attempt to prevent him from going to the
police.
The State charged Mr. Mackin with robbery under one of two provisions of the
code:
the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal
property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal
property;
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-301.
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This court has indicated that robbery requires the defendant to have an unlawful
purpose in the taking. See Sta/£ v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1056 (Utah 1985) (robbery
requires, among other things, proof that "the taking is unlawful"). This means that Mr.
Mackin would have to lack a legitimate reason to take the property. In Mr. Mackin's
case, he lacked the specific and criminal intent to rob Mitchell because he intended to
report her crime to the police. An unlawful taking occurs when the person takes property
without the owner's consent. Spectrum Health Hasps. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofMichigan,
492 Mich. 503, 524, 821 N.W.2d 117, 129(2012) (see also 128 n. 50); Couch on Insurance
§ 15 7: 18 ("A taking is unlawful when made without the authorization or consent of the
owner or person at the time.");John S. Baker,Jr., Criminal Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 361, 362
(1982) ("a taking is unlawful because it is without consent"). Mitchell, however, was not
the owner of this property, and thus, lacked the ability to withhold consent for its taking.
Additionally, Mr. Mackin needed to have the specific intent to commit a robbery.

Sta/£ v. Boyland, 27 Utah 2d 268,270, 495 P.2d 315, 316 (1972). This court has found that
a "'purpose to deprive' is inherent in the act of robbery in view of the manner of taking
specified in § 76-6-301." State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 n.l (Utah 1983); see also State v.

Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,

1 12,

63 P.3d 110 ("Defendant correctly asserts that the

robbery statute requires the State to prove that he committed the taking with a 'purpose
to deprive ... the victim of the property."'); Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-401(3).
As early at 1895 , this Court concluded that when one takes his own property from

another, even by force, he lacks the intent to commit a robbery. Peop'-e v. Hughes, 11 Utah
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100, 39 P. 492,494 (1895). While the property was not Mr. Mackin's, 5 he did not take the
purse with the purpose to deprive 1'.ifitchell of it. Rather, he wanted to give its unlawful
contents to the police, a lawful purpose.
Along that vein, this court has found that robbery contains an implicit theft
offense. State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 123 7 (Utah 1990) ("theft has been held to be a
lesser included offense of aggravated robbery because theft, by its very nature, has
elements that overlap aggravated robbery"). An affirmative defense to theft is that a
person "[a]cted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did; or .. . [o] btained or exercised control over the
property or service honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3)(6) & (c). Clearly, Mr. Mackin believed that he had the
right to take illegal items to the police under the first defense and second, that the item's
owners, such as Don Kohee (whose cell phone it was) and Cassidy Broadhead (whose
purse it was) would have consented to Mr. Mackin's returning their property to them. R.
469:107-08, 112.

5 While

the Court of Appeals has ruled that a claim of right defense is not available, this
Court has yet to address the question. State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, ~ 15, 64 P.3d
1218. And while Utah has adopted a statutory robbery scheme, it still does not prevent
this court from looking to common law notions of intent, theft and such as argued irifra.
Notably, Utah's statute explicitly requires that Mr. Mackin have the intent to steal the
property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. or did the Court of Appeals address the situation
here, where a person takes what he reasonably believes to be stolen property to give to the
police. Thus, Mr. Mackin does not argue that he had a right to the property, per se, but
that he was attempting to report the commission of a crime, something fundamentally
different to a claim of right defense.
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Both theft and robbery require that the property actually belong to the person
from whom it is taken. For theft, the code indicates that property must have "value to the
owner." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(1). Mitchell did not own any of that property. "[A]
defendant cannot be convicted of robbery unless the victim has an ownership,
representative, or possessory interest in the property taken." State v. Richie, 365 P.3d 770,
775 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Benton, 829 P.2d 451,453 (Colo. App. 1991) (a person
must have the right to exercise control over the property for their to be a robbery); State v.

Pnce, 38 Idaho 149, 2 19 P. 1049, 1050 (1 923) (a person who violently takes money from
another as part of an illegal gambling ring has not committed a robbery, but would still
be "guilty of a criminal offense"); State v. Banks, 96-652 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/ 15/97), 694 So.
2d 40 1, 410-11 (to show a robbery, the victim must have "a greater right to the item than
did the accused"). Otherwise, for robbery, the property would not be "personal" since
one would not be "depriv[ing] the person ... of the personal property." Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-301 (emphasis added). "Personal property is the right or interest which a person has
in things personal." Reese v. {)Jtaltrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 P. 955,958 (1916).
Nor is contraband personal property under Utah law. Utah's forfeiture statute
indicates that '"Property' means all property, whether real or personal, tangible or
intangible, but does not include contraband." Utah Code Ann.§ 24-1-102(18). The code
specifically mentions that drug paraphernalia, such as the syringes in the purse, is subject
to seizure and forfeiture. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-6. Thus, Mr. l\,f ackin would not be
able to commit a robbery if Mitchell did not own the property and it was contraband
since she lacked a personal interest in the property. If he violently assaulted Mitchell in

18

the recovery of the property, then he could be charged with another crime, but not with
robbery.
As the Supreme Court of Connecticut has observed in a case very similar to the
very situation at hand, Mr. Mackin could have been charged '"rith an assault (if he indeed
used excessive force) for taking stolen property from Mitchell, but not for a robbery:
a defendant who used unreasonable force to take ... a third person's
propertyQ from another person in order to prevent an attempted larceny
could not be charged with robbery in the first instance, but could be
charged only with an offense involving the use or threatened use of physical
force, such as assault or unlawful restraint.

State v. Smith, 31 7 Conn. 338, 354, 118 A.3d 49, 59 (2015).
Utah law should encourage people to take illegal items they find to the police,
which his all Mr. Mackin's defense involved. For example, if a person goes to his
brother's home and finds a severed head in a box, he should be able to take the box,
escape the home and give that item to the police. The fact that his brother might try to
assault him and dive into his car does not convert the taking into a robbery because the
taker lacks the intent to unlawfully deprive the brother of his property. Nor does the
brother have a property interest in the head. If anything, the taker is trying to effectuate
the apprehension of a criminal, something laudatory for any citizen to do.
This case is no different. Mr. Mackin never used force or violence in the taking of
the purse, and while he fought with Mitchell over retaining the purse, this was not an
unlawful taking of Mitchell's personal property. The property did not belong to her, it
was evidence of a crime, and Mr. Mackin took it to give it to the police.
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Therefore, it was highly relevant that Mr. Mackin be afforded the opportunity to
show the jury through the testimony of numerous witnesses, that Mitchell had stolen the
purse, that it contained stolen property, drug paraphernalia, that she was living in a stolen
motor home and that she intended to flee the State. This evidence would have showed
that Mr. Mackin lacked the intent to commit a robbery and that he was only attempting
to report her misconduct to the authorities.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Mackin asks this court to find that the State failed to prove an aggravated
robbery because his car was not intentionally used dangerously to rob Mitchell and that
the court erred in failing to grant him a continuance to obtain testimony that Mitchell
had stolen property.
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24-1-102. Definitions.
As used in this title:
(1) "Account" means the Criminal Forfeiture Restricted Account created in Secti on 2+-~J-11 6.

(2)(a) "Acquittal" means a finding by a jury or a judge at trial that a claimant is not guilty.
(b) An acquittal does not include:
(i) a verdict of guilty on a lesser or reduced charge;
(ii) a plea of guilty to a lesser or reduced charge; or
(iii) dismissal of a charge as a result of a negotiated plea agreement.
(3) "Agency" means any agency of municipal, county, or state government, including law
enforcement agencies, law enforcement personnel, and multijurisdictional task forces.
(4) "Claimant" means any:
(a) owner of property as defined in this section;
(b) interest holder as defined in this section; or
(c) person or entity who asserts a claim to any property seized for forfeiture under this
title.
(5) "Commission" means the Utah Commission on Criminal andJuvenileJustice.
(6) "Complaint" means a civil in rem complaint seeking the forfeiture of any real or
personal property under this title.
(7) "Constructive seizure" means a seizure of property where the property is left in the
control of the owner and the seizing agency posts the property with a notice of intent to
seek forfeiture.
(8)(a) "Contraband" means any property, item, or substance that is unlawful to produce
or to possess under state or federal law.
(b) All controlled substances that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for
distribution in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, are
contraband.
(9) "Innocent owner" means a claimant who:
(a) held an ownership interest in property at the time the conduct subjecting the property
to forfeiture occurred, and:
(i) did not have actual knowledge of the conduct subj ecting the property to forfeiture; or
(ii) upon learning of the conduct subjecting the property to forfeiture, took reasonable
steps to prohibit the illegal use of the property; or
(b) acquired an ownership interest in the property and who had no knowledge that the
illegal conduct subjecting the property to forfeiture had occurred or that the property had
been seized for forfeiture, and:
(i) acquired the property in a bona fide transaction for value;
(ii) was a person, including a minor child, who acquired an interest in the property
through probate or inheritance; or
(iii) was a spouse who acquired an interest in property through dissolution of marriage or
by operation oflaw.
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(1 0)(a) "Interest holder" means a secured party as defined in Section 70A-9a-l 09, a
mortgagee, lien creditor, or the beneficiary of a security interest or encumbrance
pertaining to an interest in property, whose interest would be perfected against a good
faith purchaser for value.
(b) "Interest holder" does not mean a person who holds property for the benefit of or as
an agent or nominee for another person, or who is not in substantial compliance with any
statute requiring an interest in property to be recorded or reflected in public records in
order to perfect the interest against a good faith purchaser for value.
(11) "Known address" means any address provided by a claimant to the agency at the
time the property was seized, or the claimant's most recent address on record with a
governmental entity if no address was provided at the time of the seizure.
(12) "Legal costs" means the costs and expenses incurred by a party in a forfeiture action.
(13) "Legislative body" means:
(a)(i) the Legislature, county commission, county council, city commission, city council, or
town council that has fiscal oversight and budgetary approval authority over an agency;
or
(ii) the agency's governing political subdivision; or
(b) the lead governmental entity of a multijurisdictional task force, as designated in a
memorandum of understanding executed by the agencies participating in the task force.
(14) "Multijurisdictional task force" means a law enforcement task force or other agency
comprised of persons who are employed by or acting under the authority of different
governmental entities, including federal, state, county or municipal governments, or any
combination of these agencies.
(15) "Owner" means any person or entity, other than an interest holder, that possesses a
bona fide legal or equitable interest in real or personal property.
(l 6)(a) "Proceeds" means:
(i) property of any kind that is obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the commission
of an offense that gives rise to forfeiture; or
(ii) any property acquired directly or indirectly from, produced through, realized through,
or caused by an act or omission regarding property under Subsection (16)(a)(i).
(b) "Proceeds" includes any property of any kind without reduction for expenses incurred
in the acquisition, maintenance, or production of that property, or any other purpose
regarding property under Subsection (l 6)(a)(i).
(c) "Proceeds" is not limited to the net gain or profit realized from the offense that gives
rise to forfeiture.
(1 7) "Program" means the State Asset Forfeiture Grant Program established in Section
24--4-11 7.
(18) "Property" means all property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, but
does not include contraband.
(19) "Prosecuting attorney" means:
(a) the attorney general and any assistant attorney general;
(b) any district attorney or deputy district attorney;
(c) any county attorney or assistant county attorney; and
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(d) any other attorney authorized to commence an action on behalf of the state under this
title.
(20) "Public interest use" means a:
(a) use by a government agency as determined by the legislative body of the agency's
jurisdiction; or
(b) donation of the property to a nonprofit charity registered with the state.
(21 ) "Real properti' means land and includes any building, focture, improvement,
appurtenance, structure, or other development that is affixed permanently to land.
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58-37a-6. Seizure -- Forfeiture -- Property rights.
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture in accordance with the
procedures and substantive protections of Title ?4, Forfeiture and Disposition of Prop rtv
Act.
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76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property
in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his
will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person
permanently or temporarily of the personal property; or

(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation;

(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
( 1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-60 1;

(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes ofthis part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occms in an attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
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76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible
personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments or
other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property,
labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of
a public utility nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water,
and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the owner thereof
intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of possession or of
some other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another;
in relation to labor or services, to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a
trade secret, to make any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under
such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use
and benefit thereof, would be lost; or

(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to,
conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory taking,
larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression oflaw or fact that is false
and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction; or

(b) Fails to correct a false impression oflaw or fact that the actor previously created or
confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of another and
that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the
transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien,
security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the
property, whether the lien, security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid
or is or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will
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not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue
without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor
did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed.
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76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the property or service
stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe,
provided an interest in property for purposes of this subsection shall not include a
security interest for the repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service involved; or

(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over
the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly believing that
the owner, if present, would have consented.
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76-10-501 (2013). Definitions.
(6)(a) "Dangerous weapon" means an item that in the manner of its use or intended use is
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
(b) The following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, or another item,
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used.
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